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Evolution and Morality 
Michael Ruse 
The most incredible fact ever discovered about human beings is that 
our ancestors were the products of a long, slow, gradual process of 
evolution, fired by a causal mechanism known as "natural selection" 
(Darwin 1871; Ruse 1982a; Pilbeam 1984 ). In recent years, students 
of human evolution, so-called "paleoanthropologists", have brought 
home to us with great force just how incredible a fact this is Qohan­
son and Edey 1981; Isaac 1983 ). The earth is about four and a half 
billion years old. Life first appeared on earth at least three and a half 
billion years ago. Mammals, the class to which humans belong, first 
appeared in primitive form some 200 million years ago, but it was not 
until the death of the dinosaurs that the Age of mammals was able to 
get underway, about 60 million years ago. 
Our ancestors, Australopithecenes, broke from the apes a mere six 
million years ago. This means that we share virtually all of our evolu­
tion with the animal world, particularly the higher apes, the chimpan­
zees, and the gorillas (Konigsson 1980). Moreover, this fact still 
remains with us. Biologically speaking, we are closer relatives of the 
chimpanzees ·than chimpanzees are of gorillas. Although through self -
importance and ignorance, humans are in fact classified quite separ­
ately, under normal circumstances we would be members of the same 
genus as chimpanzees and gorillas. This is how close we are to the 
animal world (Ayala and Valentine 1979 ). 
And yet, the average member of the philosophical community 
ignores these startling facts. It is not too much of an exaggeration to 
say that as far as the average philospher is concerned, it makes little 
difference whether we are modified monkeys or created some 6000 
years ago on the final day of Creation, miraculously, by a supernatural 
being, as is supposed by today's SO'Called "Scientific Creationists" 
(Morris 1974 ). I do not, of course, imply that the average philo­
sopher is not an evolutionist (although apparently at least one of the 
most influential philosophers of the twentieth century had doubts 
about the truth of evolution), but rather that evolution is taken to be 
totally irrelevant to the basic inquiries of the philosopher, both in the 
realm of epistemology and in the realm of ethics. (Putnam 1981 tells 
us that Wittgenstein had doubts about the truth of evolution.) 
It is this pre-nineteenth�entury attitude towards the major prob­
lems of philosophy that I intend to challenge in this paper. Specifi­
cally, I intend to concentrate on the problems of moral philosophy, 
ethics, and to argue that you simply must take evolutionary ideas 
seriously, if you are to have hope of an adequate approach to moral-
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ity. I shall argue that our knowledge of evolution, and of the mechan, 
ism by which it came about, throw light on the foundations of ethics, 
that is to say, that they are pertinent to meta-ethical questions. Fur, 
thermore, I aruge that evolution tells us something about the nature 
of the specific ethical principles to which human beings are commit, 
ted, that is, evolution tells us something about substantival ethical 
questions. It is now over a century since Charles Darwin first pub, 
lished the modern theory of evolution through natural selection in his 
Origin of Specie$ ( 1859). The time has surely come for moral philD' 
sophers to start taking Darwin's message seriously. 
T Taditional eoolutionary ethia. 
Already, philosophical readers will be feeling somewhat depressed, 
because the history of attempts to show evolution relevant to philO' 
sophy, particularly to moral philosophy, hardly inspires confidence 
(Flew 1967). On the one hand, so-called "evolutionary ethics" have 
tended to be little more than thinly-veiled apologia for reactionary 
social positions (Ruse 1982b; Russett 1976 ). All too often, it is 
argued that the key to evolution is some form of bloody struggle for 
existence, leading to the survival of the fittest. Consequently, an ethic 
based on the evolutionary process supposedly must emulate and 
indeed encourage the struggle. Thus, it is concluded that one ought to 
allow all kinds of conflict, personal and social, welcoming the success 
of the few winners. 
This so-called philosophy is often labelled "Social Darwinism", 
although it owes at least as much in its genesis to the nineteenth­
century thinker, Herbert Spencer, as it does to Charles Darwin. It 
reached its ridiculous extreme in the mind of John D. Rockefeller, the 
founder of Standard Oil, who solemnly assured a Sunday school class 
that the law of big business is the law of nature: it was right and 
proper that Standard Oil push all its competitors to the wall, because 
this is what evolution demands. Thankfully, most philosophers, and 
indeed most right-thinking folk, conclude rapidly that this kind of 
evolutionary moralizing is about as far from true morality as it is pos­
sible to get. Morality means helping the wealc and defenceless, not 
stamping on them, literally and metaphorically (Quinton 1966; 
Himmelfarb 1968 ). 
On the other hand, with reason, evolutionary ethics has been con­
demned by philosophers for committing very serious logical errors. 
As David Hume pointed out in the eighteenth century, there is a dras­
tic difference between claims about matters of fact and claims about 
morality (Hume 1978). To put it in modern terms, there is a differ­
ence between "is" statements and "ought" statements (Hudson 
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1970). Thus, if, for instance, I say say that I hate killing, that is one 
thing. In particular, it is a factual claim about my emotions. However, 
if I say that killing is wrong, that is quite another thing. That is a 
statement about an apparently objective matter of moral fact. It has 
nothing to do directly with my feelings. What Hurne pointed out is 
that you cannot properly go straight from factual statements, from 
"is" statements, to value statements, that is, to "ought" statements. 
To do so is to violate what has properly become known as "Hume's 
Law". In this century, Hume's Law was revived strongly by the writ­
ings of G.E. Moore, when he argued that it is a fallacy to try to define 
the good in terms of natural, that is to say, factual, properties. 
Moore's description of such incorrect moves was that they commit 
the "naturalistic fallacy" (Moore 1903 ). 
Critics argue, with good reason, that all attempts at evolutionary 
ethics violate Hume's Law. What happens is that people try to deduce 
the way that things ought to be from the way that things are. They 
point to the fact that there is an ongoing struggle for existence occur­
ing in nature. Even between humans, this struggle supposedly occurs. 
Thus, it is concluded that this is the way that things ought to be. 
Hence, humans have an obligation to allow a struggle to proceed 
without letup or hinderance. And we should cherish as morally 
worthwhile the ultimate products of evolution, namely human beings. 
But, unfortunately, as critics point out, this is to go from fact to 
value. Such a move is without warrant. Why should the process and 
. product of evolution in themselves be morally good? To argue this 
way is to make unjustified inferences. Fallacies are being committed. 
In short, there can be no warrant for an evolutionary ethics (Ruse 
1979a). 
Let me say right at once, that I am aware of and sensitive to such 
criticisms as these. I believe nevertheless that one can formulate a 
sound evolutionary ethics: an ethics which is, on the one hand, not a 
thinly disguised excuse for fascist ideology, and which is, on the other 
hand, quite innocent of fallacious moves from "is" to "ought". 
Indeed, what I shall argue is that Hurne and Moore and followers were 
quite right in drawing attention to the distinction between fact and 
value, and that a true evolutionary ethics not only acknowledges this 
fact, but makes use of it. Thus, whatever the faults of a revised evolu­
tionary ethics, they are not the traditional ones. 
The ewlution of morality. 
To start making my case, let me begin by discussing contemporary 
thinking about the evolution of morality. This will show that the idea 
of evolution necessarily implying a literal bloody struggle for existence 
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ia simply bad biology. When this part of the discussion is over, it will 
be possible for us to tum to questions about the status of moral 
claims and put to rest fears that any evolutionarily inspired moral phi, 
l0&0phy must necessarily commit serious logical blunders. 
As has been said, humans evolved through the process of natural 
selection. Natural selection is a consequence of several clearly defined 
and well established facts about the organic world (Ruse 1973; 
1979b; 1982a). In particular, more organisms are constantly being 
born than can possibly survive and reproduce. This leads to what is 
known, technically, as a "struggle for existence". However, it must be 
emphasized right at the start that this struggle does not necessarily 
involve bloody, hand,to-hand combat between organisms. A struggle 
could as well involve a difference in relative rates of reproduction, or 
some other non,violent process. 
Because there is a population pressure brought about by limitations 
in space and size, not all organisms that are born can possibly survive 
and reproduce. It is the claim of the evolutionist that the ensuing dif, 
ferential reproduction is a function, not merely of chance factors, but 
also of the distinctive characters that organisms themselves have. 
Some organisms will survive and reproduce because of their peculiar 
characteristics. These characteristics are known as "adaptations" 
(Lewontin 1978). 
Following Charles Darwin, it is argued that, given enough time, the 
ongoing process of different reproduction of distinctive organisms 
adds up to an evolutionary effect. This is known as 0natural selec, 
tion". The important point to note here is not simply that organisms 
evolve, but they evolve with characteristics which aid their possessors 
in the on..going struggle for reproduction. Thus we have the adapta, 
tions of hands and ears and eyes, and so forth. Darwinism (that is to 
say, Darwin's theory of evolution) provides a natural explanation for 
these characteristics which, in pre-evolutionary times were taken as 
paradigmatic evidence for God's creative design. 
Do note, however, that the "raw stuff" of evolution - the peculiar, 
ities of organisms which eventually add up to full,blown adaptations 
- is not teleologically put in place, as pre,Darwinian theists SUP' 
posed. Darwinians believe that new variations appear constantly, but 
that their nature is "random". They do not appear according to the 
needs of organisms. Selection has to make do with what it gets, and 
thus must cobble together an answer somehow. For this reason, the 
course of evolution is fundamentally non,progressive (Dobzhansky et 
al 1977; Mayr 1982 ). Humans came about through natural selection, 
thereby showing adaptations. However, at this point, we must recog, 
nize what this means, particularly in modern terms. Humans have 
taken the path of sociality. In this, they are unlike most mammals, 
where males tend to live separately from females, and where there is 
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often a separation between the generations. Humans live together in 
packs or bands, like dogs and baboons. There are advantages to doing 
this, particularly if you do not have strong weapons of attack or 
defense (Alexander 1971; 1979). (Fairly obviously, sociality and the 
lack of strong weapons were things which co-evolved.) But if you are 
to live communally, then you must have various social facilitating 
mechanisms to allow you to live with your fellows. Otherwise, you 
will simply have ongoing battles and fights within the group, as well as 
between groups. 
Modem evolutionists claim that the social relations which have 
evolved between humans are a direct function of natural selection 
(Wilson 1975; 1978). There are two major mechanisms which are 
presumed to have brought about such cooperative-type living. The 
first is known as "kin selection" (Hamilton 1964a; b; Ruse 1979a). In 
evolution, what counts is passing on your units of heredity, the so­
called ugenes". But, fairly obviously what you pass on are not the 
actual genes of your body. Rather, you pass on copies. This means 
that in theory, and indeed it turns out in practice, there is no reason 
why you should not reproduce, as it were, by proxy. Your close rela .. 
tives, like siblings, share some of the copies of the genes that you 
have. Therefore, inasmuch as close relatives reproduce, you reproduce 
yourself vicariously. Kin selection is the mechanism which captures 
this reproduction .. at .. a-distance. Inasmuch as one human helps 
another, that helper indirectly helps its own reproduction. Hence, 
cooperation serves one's own individual reproductive interests (May .. 
nard Smith 1978; Dawkins 1976). 
The second mechanisll.l which is presumed to have brought about 
sociality is so-called ureciprocal altruism" (Trivers; 1971 ). This is a 
mechanism which can even bring about cooperation between non .. 
relatives. Basically, it is all a matter of enlightened self .. interest. If I 
help you, then you will be more ready to help me in return. And the 
amount of effort it costs me to help you is probably going to be much 
compensated by the return help that I will get. If, for instance, I help 
you when I am fit and healthy, it will cost me little. But then, perhaps, 
at some point, say, when I am sick, your return help, which costs you 
little, will be of immeasurable value to me. Through the mechanism of 
reciprocal altruism, help can spread through a group. Obviously, it is 
not necessary for immediate help to be received or even expected for .. 
reciprocal altruism to occur. It could well be, and indeed probably is, 
that one individual pours its help into the pool, which is then drawn 
upon by others as needed, rather like an insurance policy (Alexander 
1979). 
I must point out here, to quell any possible doubts, that there is 
strong evidence both for kin selection and for reciprocal altruism 
through the animal world (Wilson 1975; Barash 1982). These are not 
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figments of some biologist's frenzied imagination. These are well 
established models. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that such 
mechanisms were extremely important in human evolution. There­
fore, I do want to emphasize at this point that I am not wildly specu­
lating about how evolution might have brought about morality. I am 
talking now about a level of fairly well established fact. 
But, with good reason, you might object that, although this points 
to the evolution of cooperation between humans, this tells us nothing 
about true morality (Flanagan 1981). True morality demands giving 
because it is right, not because one hopes for reward. Indeed, gener­
ally, hope of reward is taken to be inconsistent with a true moral 
sense. This is all true, but the claim of today's evolutionists, particu­
larly of those who concern themselves with the evolution of social 
behaviour (so-called "sociobiologi.sts"), is that the way that coopera­
tion has evolved between humans does indeed involve a true moral 
sense (Lumsden and Wilson 1973 ). We could, as it were, calculate 
every time we give help or receive help, what would be our best bio­
logical interests. I help you; but, as I do, I mentally note down the 
amount of help I've received from you, the probability of receiving 
help from you, and so on and so forth, very much as though I were an 
insurance actuary. The trouble with this is that such a process is 
highly inefficient. Every time I interact with you or with another 
human being, I have to stop and think about what the payoff is for 
me. This requires time, and, moreover, requires a fairly complex 
mathematical ability. Presumably, for something like this to work my 
brain is going to have to be very much more powerful than it is at the 
moment. 
The alternative strategy, one which modern evolutionists believe to 
have occurred, is to short-cut the calculation process by supposing 
that there is some objective set of standards which we all ought to 
obey. Then, when I help you, I help you not because I have calculated 
the payoff for me, but because I think it is right for me to help you. 
Conversely, when you help me, you help me and I expect help, not 
because of payoffs, but because we think that it is right. In other 
words, what is claimed by sociobiologists is that morality has evolved 
as a kind of social facilitating mechanism, which will enable all of us 
to play the social game. In a way, therefore, objective morality is a 
kind of collective illusion that we all believe in, in order to function 
socially together. If we did not have such a belief in objective moral­
ity, then no one would help anyone else, and our social structure 
would collapse. "Do this because it is right" has an effect on you, 
which "Do this because I want you to" could never have. 
How is this all supposed to come about? It could be that humans 
have completely blank minds at birth, tabula rasa, which then, as it 
were, get filled up with moral thinking. However, there are good 
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evolutionary reasons to suppose that this is not so. Rather, what is 
believed now is that the human mind at birth is already biased in cer­
tain predisposed ways. These biases are known technically as "epige-­
netic rules". They have been developed most thoroughly by the socio­
biologists, Charles Lumsden and Ed ward 0. Wilson ( 1981 ; 1983 ). 
According to modern theory, what happens is that the human mind, 
as it grows, develops in certain preset ways so that it is disposed to 
think along certain channels. 
In the realm of epistemology, for instance, we have a predisposition 
to think in certain logical and mathematical ways. We are inclined to 
believe that 2 + 2 4 rather than 5. And, the reason why we have this 
inclination, an inclination brought about by an epigenetic rule, is 
quite simple. Those of our would-be ancestors who believed that 
2+2=4 tended to survive and reproduce a lot more efficiently than 
those of our would-be ancestors who believed that 2+2=5. Similarly, 
we are predisposed to think about certain things in a causal fashion. 
Those of our would-be ancestors who were predisposed to believe 
that fire causes burning tended to out-reproduce those of our would­
be ancestors who happily, at least at first, drew no connections 
between the fire and the consequent pain brought about by the 
burning. 
In the realm of moral behaviour, one of the best-worked'Out epige­
netic rules is that which lies behind incest barriers (van de Berghe 
1979; 1983 ). Virtually every human society has barriers, often made 
. explicit as taboos, against sibling intercourse. Brothers and sisters 
simply may not, or rather should not, sleep together, at least not dur­
ing their reproductive years. (I'm sure that many siblings have exper 
ienced some sort of pre-adolescent sex play.) There are very good bio­
logical reasons why humans are biased against sibling intercourse. 
Such close inbreeding has horrific biological effects. Children of 
siblings stand a very high chance of having genetic ailments of one 
sort or another (Adams and Neel 1967). Consequently, there is and 
has been strong selective pressure against such sexual relationships. 
Sociobiologists argue that the human mind is biased or influenced 
against such relationships by one or more epigenetic rules. We have 
revulsion at the thought of sibling incestual relationships, and we ele­
vate them into explicit moral prohibitions. 
More generally, it is argued by sociobiologists that kin selection and 
reciprocal altruism, and possibly other like mechanisms, have brought 
about sociality and cooperation between humans (Alexander 1979; 
Wilson 1978; Lumsden and Wilson 1981). This cooperation is 
caused proximately by epigenetic rules, which themselves have their 
roots in natural selection, brought about by the struggle for existence. 
Thus, the epigenetic rules incline us to think that we ought to behave 
morally towards our fellow humans, particularly those in our pack or 
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society. Morality, therefore, rests ultimately on the innate biases of 
the human mind, these biases being an adaptive function of the evolu­
tionary process. This is all there is to the evolution of morality. 
At leaat, let me not overexaggerate. This is all there is to the biolog­
ical story of the evolution of human morality. No one, least of all an 
evolutionary biologist, wants to deny that the human cultural dimen­
sion takes off, and leads to effects which do not tie in directly to bio­
logical advantage. This cultural divergence and evolution is responsi­
ble for the differences between moral codes that one notes from 
country to country. However, it is the claim of the biological evolu­
tionist, the modern-day Darwinian, that underlying any cultural dif­
ferences, there is a common foundation of biological influence. This 
influence is brought about by the epigenetic rules which are them­
selves rooted in the evolutionary process, no less than our human 
hands and eyes and other anatomical adaptive features. 
� state of morality. 
Let me emphasize that, thus far, my discussion has been at the empiri­
cal level. Everything that I have said is part of the modern scientific 
theory of evolution. I do not pretend that it is all absolutely correct in 
every detail. Indeed, we are pushing at the frontiers of science. 
Moreover, there are well-known arguments about the ultimately 
unprovable status of any scientific claim (Popper 1959). But, what I 
do argue is that what has been presented so far is to be taken as 
science and not as ethereal armchair philosophizing. It is the basic 
background against which any philosophical discussion must be cast. 
But what kind of philosophical discussion is appropriate here? Are 
we any further down the line with the kinds of inquiries which con­
cern philosophers? Or, is what we have covered thus far no doubt 
interesting, but irrelevant to our main inquiry? Many philosophers 
would argue that it is as irrelevant as it is interesting (Hampshire 
1978). This is the conclusion I want to dispute strongly now. I shall 
argue in this section that what we have learnt has profound implica­
tions for the status of ethics. In particular, I want to argue that, meta­
ethically, one ought, as a Darwinian evolutionist, adopt a positive of 
"ethical scepticism". By this, I mean (as is typically meant) not that 
there is no such thing as ethics: but, rather, there is no such thing as 
an objective foundation to ethics (Mackie 1977). 
In fact, I would argue this conclusion about the lack of objective 
foundation to ethics ought to be apparent to you already. As we have 
seen, what the evolutionist claims is that morality exists as a collective 
illusion, in order to facilitate cooperation amongst humans. It is an 
adaptation, brought about by natural selection, to help us survive and 
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reproduce that much better. It has no further or ultimate end. It is as 
much a chimera as the voices that the schizophrenic "hears", or the 
messages which come from beyond at the spiritualist's seance. What 
makes ethics different from the schizophrenic 's voices and the spiritu­
alist's messages is that it is an illusion shared by us all. Hence, linguis­
tically, one can properly point out that ethics is not that which we 
mean by "illusion", if illusion applies to something possessed only by 
an aberrant few. The whole point of ethics is that everybody, or at 
least, alm�t everybody, shares in the belief that there is some sort of 
objective compulsive morality . But it does not exist all the same. 
At least, when I say ethics does not exist, of course it exists for us, 
but it does not exist as some kind of objective phenomenon irrespec­
tive of human beings. Let me put matters this way; perhaps when no 
one is around in the forest, a tree falls, and makes a noise. However, if 
no one is around in the forest, then there is no moral obligation to tell 
people to get out of the way! 
You might be tempted to agree with my premises, but deny my 
conclusions. You might feel inclined to agree with me that our ethical 
sense or capacity, or whatever you want to call it, is indeed a product 
of evolution through natural selection - that that which makes us 
moral beings is as much part of our biology as is that which makes us 
seeing or even thinking beings. However, you might then go on to 
argue that, j ust as the fact that we see through evolutionarily acquired 
abilities does not deny the objectivity of material objects, so the fact 
that we become aware of ethics through evolutionarily acquired capac­
ities does not deny the reality and independent objectivity of moral­
ity. (I myself argued precisely this in Ruse 1979a!). 
Unfortunately, this argument does not stand up, if you look at the 
full implications of Darwinian evolutionary theory. Let us grant for 
the sake of this discussion that there is, in fact, a real material world, 
and that we humans can obtain some knowledge of it or at least some 
reasonable approximation to such knowledge. This means that we are 
accepting the approximate truth of Darwinian evolutionary theory. (If 
you are prepared to grant this much and argue that our knowledge of 
the external world is subject to a fairly radical scepticism, then, for 
obvious reasons, the claims that I am making about ethics follow even 
more readily than otherwise.) 
The point which we must now go on to accept, as Darwinians, is 
that ethics could have been quite other than it is. Therefore, there is 
absolutely no necessity to ethics, a quality that an independent objec­
tive ethics is always thought to have. (Remember how Immanuel Kant 
( 1949 ), for instance, stresses the synthetic a priori nature of ethical 
claims.) What the Darwinian is committed to believing is that the way 
that we think ethically is a purely contingent fact, which could have 
been quite other had we not evolved from savannah-dwelling primates 
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some six or seven million years ago. Indeed, theTe is absolutely no 
reason why, for instance, our ethical code should not have included a 
moral prescription towards cannibalism or feces,eating or infanticide 
or any one of a number of otheT practices which, as it so contingently 
happens, we find not merely repulsive but positively immoral. The 
reason why this is so is that there are already organisms existing today 
- higher organisms existing today - which practice one or all of 
these - to us -revolting activities. Had we, for instance, evolved 
from cave dwellers or some such thing, then it is quite possible that 
we would feel a moral compulsion to ear our children or to dine on 
the feces of our fellows (Ruse 1984 ). 
What these rather horrible examples show is that that which we rake 
to be moral is a purely contingent facet of our evolution. Had things 
gone another way, which Darwinism insists that they might have done, 
then we would have a completely different moral code. This is a point 
which cannot be overemphasized. As noted earlier, the absolute 
essence of modern evolutionary theory is that there is no progression up 
towards some fixed point, remarkably like humans (Ruse 1979b). This 
is a remnant of pre,Darwinian Christian thought, most specifically the 
old "chain of being" hypothesis (Lovejoy 1936 ). It has no place 
whatsoever in the modern evolutionary world. Evolution goes with 
the most adaptively advantageous at the time, and is thus totally ran, 
dom from a long-term perspective. Ethics, in short, is contingent. It is 
a happenstance facet of our primate nature and, as such, can have no 
eternal underpinning. This denies it the special status that it is always 
accorded by those who argue for an objective ethics, with a reality in 
some way independent of, or transcending, human existence.1 
But, still you might persist, arguing that even though it so conting­
ently happens to be our nature that we recognize such moral impera­
tives as "love your neighbour", this is hardly to deny the existence of 
some kind of eternal objective reality to such a moral claim as "love 
your neighbour". Perhaps it is part of our evolutionary nature that we 
believe such moral dictates. But this is not to deny that it is also (and 
more importantly) God's desire that we love our neighbour, or that 
something akin to a Platonic world of eternal forms demands that we 
love our neighbour, or some other such thing which gives an extra 
human foundation to moral codes. 
Unfortunately, however, you are now stuck with the consequence 
that objective morality is redundant. Consider two possible universes: 
one with objective morality and the other with no such morality. And 
suppose them to be identical otherwise, and of such a nature that human 
beings evolve. (In speaking of Darwinian evolution as being random, I 
am not denying that it is causal. Nor am I pretending that, were the world 
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exactly as it was in the beginning, it would not produce organisms just 
as they have evolved.) What you have then is two sets of humans, one 
in each imaginary universe. Both of them believe exactly the same 
things: both of them have the same moral code. Both of them, for 
instance, believe that a binding ethical dictate is "love your neigh­
bour,,. The only difference is that, in the one universe, the human 
beliefs corresond to objective reality, and, in the other universe, there 
is no such objective morality for the beliefs to correspond to. 
What this all means, obviously, is that the objective morality is 
totally redundant. The universe without the objective morality func­
tions just as well as the universe with it. But surely, this is a contradic­
tion, at least as the notion of objective morality is commonly under­
stood. If there's one thing an objective morality cannot be, it is 
redundant. If it is God's will that we should love our neighbour, it 
cannot be immaterial to us humans that it is indeed God's will that we 
should love our neighbour. This is what makes it right and proper for 
us to love our neighbour. What I argue, therefore, is that even if one 
supposes an objective morality, it is going to be redundant, given a 
Darwinian background, and that this is a reductio ad absurdum of the 
very notion of objective morality. If you are a Darwinian evolutionist, 
then you must be an ethical sceptic. 
I would argue indeed that, given Darwinism, the situation is even 
worse for objective morality than that of redundancy. Given the ran­
domness of Darwinian evolution and the fact that we could well have 
·evolved into rational beings that think it morally obligatory to eat our 
fellows, then it could well be that we all share a collective delusion 
about eating our fellows, even though objective morality would have 
us love our fellows. In other words, given Darwinism, it is quite pos­
sible that we all believe one thing morally, although it is the rule of 
objective morality that we should believe something else quite differ­
ent. In fact, as you might imagine, there is absolutely no reason why 
we in our present state should have actually arrived at objective mor­
ality. Perhaps indeed it is God's will that we should eat our fellows, 
but we poor deluded fools think otherwise. 
The point which must be reiterated again and again is that Darwi­
nian evolution has no place for progress (Midglev 1978). We are 
where we are because of random factors and the opportunistic effects 
of natural selection. It simply cannot be that we have evolved, as it 
were, towards an end which makes us aware of the way that we really 
ought to behave. The only sense that can be given to ccought" by a 
Darwinian evolutionist is a contingent sense, which is purely a func­
tion of our present social state. There is no correspondence to any­
thing over and beyond us. 2 
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We have seen how a Darwinian must answer the basic questions of 
meta-ethics. When queried about the ultimate foundations of moral­
ity, the Darwinian evolutionist must argue that there are no such 
ultimate foundations. But I do want to emphasize that this does not 
mean that the Darwinian is totally amoral. Indeed, as was pointed out 
earlier, the whole point about Darwinian evolution is that one can 
explain the evolution of morality. One is not explaining away moral­
ity. What one is doing, at most, is explaining away the supposed 
objective foundation to morality. But what, then, is the morality of a 
Darwinian, you may ask. This is a fair question, and it is that which I 
shall attempt to answer in this section. 
The easiest way to answer the question is to play off Darwinism 
against already-established traditional answers to the ultimate bases of 
moral behaviour. Let me pick out three well-known ones for purposes 
of discussion. The first is a kind of idealistic ethic, which is based on a 
combination of the view of Socrates in the first book of Plato's Repub­
lic and the views of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. The second 
position is one roughly associated with the name of Immanuel Kant 
( 1949). It is a view which puts an emphasis on the individual as 
opposed to the group. Remember that Kant's supreme ethical norm, 
the Categorical Imperative, had, as one of its major forms, the exhor­
tation to "treat others as ends in themselves, and not merely as 
means" (Kant 1959). A modern version of Kantianism is that of John 
Rawls ( 1971 ), who expects us to treat everyone fairly. The third well­
known philosophical position specifying a basic ethical philosophy is 
utilitarianism. This is the view which demands that actions be judged 
in accordanace with the happiness they cause and against the side con­
sequences of unhappiness. Inasmuch as an action tends to promote 
happiness as opposed to unhappiness, it is to be judged good. As a 
corollary: the more happiness, the better (Mill 1863 ). 
The Darwinian position certainly captures some of the basic tenets 
of the idealistic approach to morality. The whole force of the mechan­
isms of kin selection and reciprocal altruism is that we will have 
epigenetic rules demanding of us that we help others, and that, 
moreover, we do this because we think that it is right to help others. 
Nevertheless, if you push this idealism to an extreme, demanding with 
Jesus that you give not merely seven times but seven times seventy 
times, and even more, in other words, if you demand that you go on 
giving virtually without end, and that this should continue whether or 
not one gets any response, then I suspect that the evolutionist at some 
point will cry "stop". There has to be some sort of return, or at least 
a prospect of return for the mechanisms of evolution to function ade­
quately (Wilson 1978 ). 
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ln short, the evolutionary approach to ethics suggests that our 
moral capacities only go thus far, and if the people that we interact 
with give no response or return whatsoever, then we will shut off our 
feeling of moral obligation. We will regard such people as beyond the 
moral realm in some way - "pathological" or some such thing. 
Furthermore, my suspicion is that given the difference between kin 
selection and reciprocal altruism, as a Darwinian, you expect to find 
morality extending further if you are dealing with relatives rather than 
non-relatives. The evolutionist expects people to have a stronger feel­
ing of moral obligation towards their own children than towards 
strangers. This, it seems to me, is incompatible with the way in which 
both Socrates and Jesus are usually read (Singer 1981 ). I would add, 
however, that this incompatibility may be a modern reading, because 
Socrates did not extend his views on morality to non-Athenians or to 
slaves, and there is some doubt about how far Jesus intended his 
views in the Sermon on the Mount to extend to non-Jews. 
(Remember, it was only after Jesus' death that Christianity was broa­
dened to the Gentile world.) 
You may object that this is a serious limitation to morality as 
understood by the Darwinian. However, I would respond that it is 
merely a realistic appraisal of our moral feelings anyway. Most people 
certainly behave as though they have a far stronger obligation to their 
own children than to the children of others. Moreover, I suspect that 
most people would back this up if challenged, and feel morally nau­
seated by someone who was spending all his/her money on the child­
ren of strangers while his/her own family did without. There would 
be a feeling that such a person was trying to buy his/her way into the 
kingdom of heaven at his/her family's expense, and that this was 
simply wrong. (Remember Dickens' savage attack on such people in 
Bleak Howe.) 
Moreover, the evolutionist would argue that when we look at peo­
ple's feelings of morality, generally, it is pretty clear that whatever we 
may say on a Sunday about the need to love everyone indifferently, in 
fact, few, if any of us, really believe this. We really believe that we 
should help those who are prepared to help us. Certainly, we should 
go that extra way with other people, but ultimately morality requires 
some sort of response. If no response is forthcoming, then (as noted) 
we tend to strike off people as moral agents, arguing that they are sick 
or monsters or some such thing. Or, effectively, we do the same thing. 
We take them out of society, by imprisoning or executing them. 
Note, however, that we usually demand response (or inflict punish­
ment) not in the name of self calculaton - "I help you, now you 
should help me" - but in the name of morality - "You have a 
moral obligation to help me, just as I had such an obligation to help 
you". 
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But what about saints, you may ask (Singer 1981 ). What about 
Mother T ercsa? Does she not confound your approach towards ideal­
ism? She gives unstintingly, without thought or hope of return. Well, 
the evolutionist is certainly not going to be bothered by one or two 
counter-aamples. Natural selection, unlike a Christian god, never 
guarantees perfection or total harmony. At best, what one loolcs for is 
a rough and ready working, from an adaptive point of view. The fact 
that one OT two people behave in maladaptive ways, in the name of 
idealistic morality, hardly disproves Darwinism. Moreover, perhaps 
somewhat cynically but not necessarily unfairly, the Darwinian would 
suspect that many so-called saints are in fact looking for rewards, if 
not in this world, then in the next. In other words, saints believe that 
there is some sort of payoff in the broad scheme of things. If they do 
not, why does the Church have to keep harping on the heresy of 
doing good for the wrong reasons? 
The Kantian view of substantitivc morality, particularly as offered in 
some of its more modern manifestations, for instance, by John Rawls 
( 1971) in his theory of justice, fits very readily with an evolutionary 
backing. In fact, the Kantian emphasis on the individual seems almost 
like reciprocal altruism in action. What this biological mechanism 
leads to are epigenetic rules demanding that we help others, and that 
we individuals in tum have the right to expect help. In other words, it 
makes us think that everybody is entitled to some share of the pot 
and that this sharing should be done in the name of fairness, because, 
if this is thus performed, then we ourselves will benefit along with the 
rest. This sounds very close to the Kantian Categorical Imperative, as 
well as the claims of like philosophers. It is interesting to note, in fact, 
that John Rawls ( 1971, p. 503) does at one point speculate that the 
kind of neo .. Kantian philosophy that he expounds, where the empha .. 
sis is on justice as fairness, might have an evolutionary background. 
Rawls does not follow this up in any great detail; but, I would suggest 
that he should, as should we (Gibbard 1982 ). 
A utilitarian approach to ethics lilcewise strikes a happy response 
from biology. There are good biological reasons why a good meal or 
sexual intercourse or the love of our children makes us happy. But 
note that the Darwinian is not simply saying that we want happiness. 
That is no moral dictate at all. What the Darwinian says is that we 
want happiness for ourselves, because happiness is generally assoca­
ited with those things which are biologically good for us - the causal 
connection being that biology promotes a sense of happiness about 
those things which we ought to have, biologically speaking. The 
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Darwinian then goes on to say that we are most likely to maximize 
those things which make us happy, if we share the sentiment that we 
ought to promote the happiness of others ( Barash 1982 ). lf we believe 
in this - that we ought to promote the maximum happiness - then 
this will rebound to our benefit, more than if we simply set out self­
ishly to promote our own happiness. Thus, the Darwinian is not 
simply arguing that we ought to look after ourselves, but that we 
ought to promote the general happiness. This, of course, is the basic 
proposition of the utilitarian. 
I would not want to say that the Darwinian would go right down 
the line with every utilitarian. For instance, I could well imagine that 
situation, biologically speaking, where it might be better to do some­
thing which is not a very pleasurable thing to do. For instance, if you 
had some disease which you knew was going to make you progres­
sively more unhappy , the biological urge to live might nevertheless 
outweigh the apparent minimizing of unhappiness by commiting sui­
cide ( Wilson 1975). But subject to qualifications like these, which I 
suspect many utilitarians would admit and argue for anyway, the 
Darwinian evolutionist seems to embrace quite readily something like 
the Greatest Happiness Principle. 
I argue, therefore, in conclusion, that although the evolutionist will 
subscribe to an ethics which will be somewhat more circumscribed 
than one would get from an idealistic position, that the Darwinian 
evolutionist would fed happy in arguing for moral philosophies along 
the lines of those sketched by the Kantians and by the utilitarians. We 
have epigenetic rules which lead us to think that such courses of 
action as endorsed by Kantians and utilitarians are those which we 
ought to promote. 
You might, perhaps, complain that this is all a little bit too catholic. 
After all, there are differences between Kantians and utilitarians (Tay­
lor 1978). The Kantian puts an emphasis on the individual, whereas 
utilitarians tend to put an emphasis on the value of the group. T radi­
tionally, also, there is a difference between Kantians and utilitarians in 
that, whereas the former find value in the intention and the act, the 
latter tend to judge morality in terms of consequences, Did your 
actions maximize happiness? Surely, the Darwinian ought to decide 
between one position or the other. 
However, in response, I would point out that, in fact, usually Kan­
tian and utilitarian and others who subscribe to variant or alternative 
moral philosophies, do not differ that greatly about the right course 
of action. Most of the time, the Kantian and the utilitarian would 
agree that certain things are right and that certain things are wrong. 
Raping small children, for instance, is unambiguously wrong, both 
because it violates the Categorical Imperative, and because it violates 
the Greatest Happiness Principle. Conversely, helping a widow in 
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distress is something which is good both for the Kantian and for the 
utilitarian. It should not be forgotten that the job of moral philcr 
sophers is to pick out counter-examples and awkward instances. That 
philosphers are very good at doing this, does not deny the fact that 
most of the time, what one ought to do is fairly unambiguously 
obvious, and that all of the major moral philosophies cohere. Thus, 
that the Darwinian would feel happy with both Kantianism and utilit­
arianism is not to say that Darwinism has no moral force at all. It is 
rather to say that, in the ninety or more percent of times when Kan­
tian and utilitarian would agree on the right course of action, the 
Darwinian would likewise agree. 
But what about the points where there are disagreements? Well, 
perhaps when there are genuine differences in moral insight, this is 
simply a point where evolution lets us down. Should you sacrifice the 
individual for the group? Should you value the well-intentioned 
bungler over the efficient cynic? Perhaps there is no ultimate answer. I 
keep emphasizing the fact that evolution is a rough and ready process, 
and does not guarantee perfection ( Lewontin 1 978). Certainly, evolu­
tion does not guarantee that there must always be an answer to every 
moral problem. This is the strong implication of such an empirical 
approach as I am advocating in this paper. 
If there were an objective ethics, then presumably there would 
always be an ultimately right answer. God could not, for instance, 
leave us hanging about what we ought to do (or prefer) in some par­
ticular case - although, possibly, we might never realize fully what we 
ought to do, because of our personal limitations. But, if you take the 
naturalistic approach to ethics that I am advocating, then perhaps 
sometimes there simply are cases where there is no morally right or 
wrong answer. Fortunately, these are relatively rare, and so, from a 
biological point of view, they can be tolerated. I would argue, how­
ever, that this inability to yield answers to all moral queries is not a 
weakness of the Darwinian approach to ethics. It is rather a fact, just 
as it is a face that quantum mechanics no longer subscribes to conven­
tional notions of causality. This is no weakness in quantum mechan­
ics. It is, if anything, a strength in that it acknowledges the way that 
the world really is. 
Obje<:iions. 
I do not expect that such a radically naturalistic philosophy as I pro-­
mote in this discussion will find ready acceptance among philcr 
sophers. There will, no doubt, be many objections. I cannot hope to 
answer to all of them in this discussion; but, let me address three, 
which will almost certainly be made. 
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First, there will be the objection that what I am tallcing of is not 
true morality at all, but rather, some cynical self-directed set of emo­
tions which portray humans as calculating, hypocritical, amoral, 
computer-like robots ( Singer 198 1 ;  Trigg 1 982 ). It will be argued that 
an approach which explicitly starts with the biological advantages to 
be accrued from cooperating can have little or nothing to do with the 
disinterested goodness which is at the heart of all true morality. 
In response to this objection, let me simply say that if you think it 
has force, then either you have not followed what I've said or I have 
failed to make myself clear. The whole point is that we are talking of 
the evolution of genuine morality. Humans believe that there is some 
objective disinterested code of ethics, which they should obey. That is 
what morality is all about. What the evolutionary explanation does is 
show that this is illusory, in the sense that there is no such referent to 
morality. But, the explanation certainly does not deny that when we 
use moral claims, we mean something very different from that which 
we mean when we use factual claims. 
The evolutionist, more than anyone, agrees that humans do not cal­
culate self-interest when they cooperate. Morality is a more efficient 
way of achieving self-interest than conscious calculation. The fact that 
the evolutionist argues that there is a causal underpinning to morality 
no more denies the genuine nature of moral sentiments than , for 
instance, would it deny the genuineness of Mother Teresa's altruism, 
were one to point out that her behaviour had its origins in, say, a very 
strict upbringing ( Ruse 1 979a). Mother Teresa is a fine moral person, 
whatever her background. However, surely, no educator would want 
to argue that her background, or the background of anyone else, is 
totally irrelevant to his/her present behaviour, including his/her 
present moral behaviour. 
For this reason, I would deny the surely-to-be-made charge that 
protestations aside, the evolutionary ethicist (as defended in this dis­
cussion) is violating Hume's law or committing the naturalistic fallacy. 
One is not attempting to deduce ought-statements from is-statements. 
A value claim, an ought-statement, means something quite different 
from an is-statement, a factual claim. What one is doing is using fac­
tual claims, is-statements, to explain away the supposed objective ref­
erent of value claims, ought-statements. 
In a way, therefore, what one can say is not that the evolutionary 
ethicist is denying the is/ ought distinction, or trying to bridge the 
is/ought distinction. Rather, to use a sporting metaphor, the evolu­
tionist is doing an end run around the is/ ought distinction. He or she 
is agreeing that the is/ ought distinction is important, in the sense of 
meaning, but he/ she denies that this implies that one cannot explain 
morality in terms of factual claims. There are no formal fallacies being 
committed in this brand of evolutionary ethics. No one is trying to 
deduce that which we ought to do from the way that things are. 
18
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol15/iss1/1
22 Michael Rwe 
Rather, the evolution of the moral capacity is being revealed; and, 
once this revelation has occurred, then, it is argued, we can draw 
important philosophical implications about that which the capacity 
supposedly deals with. 
The second objection is that since the evolutionary approach makes 
morality dependent upon human beings, then all becomes relative. If I 
feel like doing one thing, I can, and if you feel like doing another 
thing, you can ,  and there is ultimately no way of deciding between us. 
Thus, supposedly, morality collapses into a morass of different wishes 
and desires. This again, however, is to misunderstand radically the 
force of the evolutionary argument. The evolutionist claims not 
simply that we have certain desires, but that we have moral inclina­
tions, brought about (via the epigenetic rules) by natural selection. I 
do not simply hate killing; I think that killing is wrong. Likewise, you 
think that killing is wrong. And, I think you ought not lcill, just as 
you think I ought not kill. The point is that we humans are all 
members of the same biological species, with the same evolutionary 
past. Morality may be relative to the human species, or to species lilce 
us; but, within the species, morality is a shared phenomenon. Indeed, 
the whole point about morality is that it will not worlc unless it is 
shared. If only a few of us held the illusion of morality, then we 
would be suckers to be wiped out in the course of evolution by natu­
ral selection very rapidly (Murphy 1982 ). 
Thus, it can be seen that any relativism is of a kind which leaves 
morality untouched. The evolutionist indeed affirms the universality 
of moral sentiments within our species. What he or she does is deny 
their ultimate objectivity; but, this is quite another thing. We all 
lcnow that there are certain rules of baseball, that you cannot, or at 
least should not, break. If you do break them, you will be penalized, 
and ultimately thrown out of the game. Obviously, no one pretends 
that baseball is other than a human invention. Morality is not in this 
sense an invention. It is something which has been conferred on us by 
our past. However, it is just as human as baseball. It too has its rules 
that you must not break. Otherwise, you too will be penalized or 
thrown out of the game. 
The third objection is perhaps not so much an objection, but more 
a query. How is it that philosophers can have been so blind to the 
true nature of morality as the evolutionist claims? Does this mean that 
2500 years of philosophizing about morality is virtually worthless, lit­
tle more than an academic exercise in moral logic-chopping? The 
answer to this query is that, in a sense, one would expect much moral 
philosophizing which occurred before Darwin to be redundant or rad­
ically incomplete. The evolutionist and here I would include myself, is 
quite serious when he or she argues that the coming of evolutionary 
theory must necessarily make a radical difference to our conceptions 
of ourselves, calling for fundamental reevaluations. 
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Thus, in a way, I welcome a break with the past, feeling that it 
srrengthens the case that I am making, rather than weakening it. How­
ever, having said this, I do not pretend that no one before the publica­
tion of Darwin's Origin had any inkling of the way in which morality 
occurs or functions. To assume this would be presumptuous indeed. 
In fact, one vigorous well-known approach to moral thought, namely 
that of the British empiricists, is a natural forerunner to the evolu­
tionary approach (Mackie 1 979 ). Historically, you would expect this, 
since the great British evolutionists of the nineteenth century were 
themselves well-steeped in empiricist thought. And in fact, you can 
see conceptually that suspicions based on history do have a strong 
claim to being correct. 
Most particularly, if you look at the work of David Hurne ( 1978 ), 
you see that he is the complete forerunner of the evolutionary ethical 
position sketched in this paper. Hurne argued that morality is not 
some objective phenomenon, but a q uestion of feeling or sentiment 
which works between people in order to facilitate social mechanisms. 
This is entirely the position of the evolutionist. Moreover, one can 
trace Hume's ideas back at least to the position of Thomas Hobbes, 
who started with the supposition that humans are naturally opposed 
to each other, and that morality must in some way come out as a 
compromise or result of individual self interests. This, obviously, is 
the starting point of the Darwinian evolutionist. 
Hence, I argue that evolutionary ethics is not some completely new 
phenomenon. It is the natural continuation of an approach to moral 
philosophy started by Hobbes, which found its pre-evolutionary 
flowering in the work of David Hume ( Murphy 1 982 ). Now, at last, 
we are in a position to carry forward the work of the empiricists. We 
can make clear and complete that which they could not, because we 
( unlike them) are no longer ignorant of the fact and process of 
evolution. 
Conclusion. 
This discussion has been part empirical and part philosophical. I argue 
that we are now at last in a a position to grasp the essential outlines of 
the biological evolution of human morality. When one does this, one 
sees that morality has no objective existence of its own. It is purely an 
adaptive mechanism for facilitating cooperation between humans. As 
such, it is a collective illusion. But to argue this is neither to pitch 
oneself into a crypto-fascist view of human nature, nor is it to commit 
appalling conceptual fallacies. It is, rather, to grasp the essential 
humanness of our nature. Moral philosophy can grow out of its Crea­
tionist Christian antecedents. At last, it can grapple realistically with 
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the fact that we hum.ans, l.ilce the rest of organic nature, are the end 
products of a long slow process of evolution through natural selec­
tion. For myself, I find this a liberating and exhilarating beginning, not 
a morbid conclusion to all that I have hitherto held dear. To paraph­
rase St. Paul, the time has come to stop looking through a glass 
dark.ly, and to grow up. 
Note. 
1 No doubt, the Kantian and othCTs would deny that we could have morality 
without human existence. However, as soon as we do have existent human 
bdngs, the claim is that morality is "laid upon' them. Without right-angled tri­
angles, you have no Pythagorean theorem. But, when you have such triangles, 
� theorem is not one option among many. This necessity is what Darwinism 
denies in the realm of morality. You could have rational beings, who thought 
pure hate the highest moral imperative. More on this point in a moment. 
2 I suspect the Kantian will object that the two-worlds hypothesis affects his/her 
position not at all. He/she believes morality is a necessary relationship arising 
when (and only when) you have rational beings. There is no objective morality 
external to humans, but, when humans have evolved, there is morality. How­
ever, the pouibillty of rational beings guided by pure hate docs confound the 
Kantian. I sec Darwinism allowing the evolution of social beings whose interac­
tions arc governed by such hate. "Hate everyone! Look after yourself! But 
remember, the other fellow is out to get you too, so most of the time, you'll 
simply have to cooperate. But you owe it to yourself, morall,, to loathe your fel­
low man." 
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